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“Was Peirce a Genuine Anti-
Psychologist in Logic?”
Claudine Tiercelin
1 Alhough Peirce clearly identified his own pragmatism with the two key ideas that it
entirely grew out from formal logic (5.469) and that “every thought is a sign” (5.470),1
the  implications  of  such  ideas  for  Peirce’s  attitude  toward  psychology,  and,  in
particular, in its relations with logic and metaphysics, are still too seldom emphasized.
As a result, and in about the same way as for Peirce’s original views on vagueness, we
do not get a perfect sense of what he was aiming at, if we look at his analyses through
the traditional  lenses  and the classical  dichotomies  we have mainly inherited from
Frege or Husserl,  namely,  in terms of such current oppositions as:  how we ought to
think according to logical rules, laws and norms, versus how we do think according to
actual features and conditions of the real functioning of our human mind; norms versus 
nature, normative explanation versus natural description, objective causes or necessary
rules of logical processes versus subjective or psychological reasons. Indeed, not only
does Peirce share with his fellow pragmatists a general dislike of such dualisms, but the
difficulty in stating, for example, what “psychologism” for him amounts to, is increased
in his case2 by the often idiosyncratic meanings he attaches to most of the concepts at
stake  in  the  debate  such  as:  logic,  logical  rules  and  inferences,  psychology,
psychologism,  norms,  nature,  naturalism,  mind,  consciousness,  belief,  disposition,
doubt, affective states in general, etc.
2 As a consequence, it is often hard to determine not so much whether he changed his
views  over  the  years  (Dougherty  1980;  Kasser  1999;  and  Hookway  1992,  2000),  as
whether he was or was not a straightforward “antipsychologist,” or rather a “weak”
psychologist, whether one could reconcile some apparent tensions between naturalistic
elements and almost trancendental ones (Goudge 1947), etc. In order to be fair to his
very  sophisticated  views,  one  should  give  a  detailed  account  not  only of  all  such
concepts, but also of all their intricate relations, and also, of course, of the major (and
at times contradictory) influences exerted on Peirce by such authors as, Kant, Boole,
Venn,  De  Morgan,  Mill,  Bain,  the  Scottish  school  of  common  sense,  German
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experimental psychology, several theoricians of evolution, but also, and from the start,
various (and at times opposed) scholastics (Ockham, Duns Scotus). Needless to say that
such an account extends the scope of this paper.3 So, in what follows, I shall merely
concentrate on a few concepts, influences and issues, so as to clarify Peirce’s views, and
to enlighten their extreme originality and contemporary relevance.
3 The very “raison d’être” of pragmatism was, from the start, to make sure of the meaning
of the concepts we are using, and to check whether the distinctions we draw are real or
merely  verbal.  So,  before  determining  whether  Peirce  was  or  was  not  an  anti-
psychologist in logic, it is crucial to make one’s ideas clear about what he means, at
least by “logic,” and by “psychology” itself.
⁂
4 As far as logic is concerned, it is important to remember – all the more so as Frege is
supposed  to  be,  together  with  Hussel,  the  champion  of  the  condemnation  of
psychologism in logic4 – that, from a mere historical point of view, Peirce followed a
different road than Frege’s,  namely,  what Van Heijenoort used to call  the semantic
tradition (Boole, Schröder, Löwenheim) as opposed to the “syntactic” trend (Russell,
Frege) (Van Heijenoort 1985): Peirce insists more upon such semantic notions as truth,
validity  and  satisfiability  of  logical  formulae  than  on  syntactic  notions  such  as
demonstrability  from  a  set  of  axioms  or  rules  of  inference.  His  treatment  of  the
quantifiers together with his correct definition of validity for the sentential calculus
constitute major achievements (Tiercelin 1991a: 187).5 But it is also crucial to note that
he gave a twist to this semantic tradition by proposing a very idiosyncratic semiotic
version  of  logic  (Tiercelin  1991a:  187-213). Compared,  for  example,  with  Boole’s  or
Schröder’s own semantic treatments of formal logic, Peirce’s approach is distinctive in
placing logic within the broader context of a general theory of meaning, understanding
and interpretation,  a  theory  of  how  signs  function,  which  enables  him  to  classify
different sorts of sign in a natural way. Thus, Peirce’s joining the semantic trend is not
merely a matter of chance or of following a certain tradition; rather, it is because of his
having philosophical  reasons to  rest  his  semantic  approach in  logic  upon a  semiotic
perspective.
5 Indeed, Peirce does not take logic in a narrow sense according to which formal logic,
would be constituted by the deductive part of logic, whereas, in a wide sense, it would
embrace the theory of logic as semiotic: namely, the general theory of signs, or the
study of anything whose function is to represent something (4.373).6 Logic is always
viewed from a philosophical and ontological perspective.7 This explains, first, why Peirce,
who called himself “an Aristotelian of the scholastic wing, approaching Scotism, but
going  much  further  in  the  direction  of  scholastic  realism”  (5.77n)  or  “a  scholastic
realist of a somewhat extreme stripe” (5.470) was, from the start, an admirer of the
scholastics  (Tiercelin  1993a,  and 2006:  158)  and also  very severe  with Kant’s  “most
astounding ignorance of the traditional logic, even of the very Summulae Logicales, the
elementary schoolbook of the Plantagenet era,” considering that “the debonnaire and
degagé fashion” Kant treated logic,  was very much responsible for his “most hasty,
superficial, trivial, and even trifling” examination of the relation of his categories to his
“functions of judgment” (1.560 and 2.31). While admitting that the medieval thinkers
showed “a beastlike superficiality and lack of generalizing thought” in their writings on
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logic  (1.560)  and  “set  up  their  idle  logical  distinctions  as  precluding  all  physical
inquiry,” (6.361) he also praised “the minute thoroughness with which they examined
every  problem  that  came  within  their  ken,”  (1.560)  and  the  fact  that  “their  logic,
relatively to the general condition of thought, was marvelously exact and critical.” Indeed, “
their analyses of thought and their discussions of all those questions of logic that almost trench
upon metaphysics are very instructive as well as very good discipline in that subtle kind
of thinking that is required in logic”(1.15, 1905; my emphasis),  and he said that his
reading of  the  medievals  “stimulated”  him in  his  early  (Kantian)  inquiry  “into  the
logical  support  of  the  fundamental  concepts  called  categories,”  (1.560)  and  in  the
constitution of his early Semeiotic and thought sign theory (Tiercelin 2006: 158-9). 
6 Secondly, Peirce  never  clearly  separated  formal  logic  from semiotic.8 Semiotic  is  but
another name for logic, but a logic which is in close connection with mathematics as
well as psychology and ontology. Indeed, and this is somewhat paradoxical: the more
signs become specified, the less semiotic appears as an autonomous science, since it is
the whole of logic (hence of logic in its most formal part too) which is then defined as
semeiotic  (Fisch  1986:  338-9;  and  Tiercelin  1991b).  With  some  hesitations  first,
admitting he is a bit ambiguous in his use of the term of logic, “at once the name of a
more general science and a general branch of that science” (Ms 751), Peirce ends up
identifying logic with Semeiotic.  Of course, although logic is now semiotic through and
through,  it  does  not  constitute  the  whole of  Semeiotic.  It  is  only  what  is  called
cenoscopic  (Ms  499),  formal  (NEM  IV:  20),  general  (1.444),  normative  (2.111),
speculative (Ms 693), or “the a priori theory of signs” (Ms 634), “the quasi-necessary, or
formal doctrine of signs” (2.227), “the pure theory of signs, in general” (Ms L 107). And
this is why, besides cenoscopic semeiotic, there are, or more exactly, may be idioscopic
studies  as  various  as  the  idioscopic  sciences  themselves:  physics,  biology,  geology,
anthropology, psychology, medical science, music, politics, etc. Peirce clearly says he
hopes for such a thing in 1909 (Ms 634) and views himself as “a pioneer, or rather a
backwoodsman, in the work of clearing and opening up what I call semeiotic, that is,
the doctrine of the essential nature and fundamental varieties of possible semiosis,”
finding “the field too vast, the labor too great, for a first-comer” (5.488. See Tiercelin
1995: 38-9). Yet, such enthusiastic claims should be qualified: 1) The semiotic which is
established in 1867 has logic as its starting-point. 2) When semiotic is developed in the
1868 papers, into a semantical theory of knowledge, in virtue of which not only thought
is a sign, but man itself is a sign (5.313), it surely means already, some extension of
semiotic to other domains, the framing of some possible new model of the mind, but
such a theory’s first aim is to prove that, without it, the validity of the laws of logic 
would be “inexplicable.”  3)  When Peirce declares  he wishes  to  develop a  semeiotic
study of other branches than logic, he also reminds that the reasonings involved there
must  be  capable  of  being  submitted  to  logical  study.  Such  is  precisely  the  case  of
psychology (Tiercelin 1995: 39-40): 
Of course psychologists ought to make, as in point of fact they are making, their
own invaluable studies of the sign-making and sign-using functions – invaluable, I
call  them,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  they  cannot  possibly  come  to  their  final
conclusions until other more elementary studies have come to their first harvest.
(Ms 675) 
7 4)  Although the somewhat elastic  frontier  between the various fields  of  knowledge
seems  to  allow for  a  general  theory  of  signs  conducted  by  other  researchers  than
logicians, one may wonder whether – and to what extent – Peirce really considered the
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question, since it is so obvious to him that everything that has been achieved until then
in that direction was done by logicians (Whately, Mill, Boole, Ockham) that it seems
natural to view them as the best group of researchers to pursue the task. Thus, even if
“a piece of concerted music is a sign, and so is a word or signal of command,” and if
“logic has no positive concern with either of these kinds of signs,” “it is not likely that
in our time there will be anybody to study the general physiology of the non-logical
signs except the logician” (Ms 499). 5) Finally, is it not strange that the so-called father
of such a generalized semiotic, who was not particularly stingy about grand projects,
should have only taken as one of his major works – which he hoped to be as successful
in  the  21th  century  as  Mill’s  System  of  Logic – a  “System  of  Logic  considered  as
Semeiotic”  (Ms  640,  NEM III:  875),  i.e.  a  book  dealing,  not  with  the  whole  field  of
semeiotic, but with the only logic or cenoscopic semeiotic? As a consequence, one can
hardly speak of a “Peircean Semiotic,” thereby meaning a branch of which Peirce would
have explicitly delimited the range of application or forgiven in advance any kind of
extrapolation. On the contrary, it is quite clear that Semiotic was always viewed by
Peirce  in  relation  with  logic  (which,  incidentally,  is  one  point  of  departure  from
Saussure. See Tiercelin 1991b and 1995: 40-1). 
8 3. So the basic distinction to be made in logic is not between a “narrow” and a “wide”
domain Rather it is, between logic and mathematics. However, it is a distinction which is
not grounded on a division between two specific domains, since mathematics is not
defined by its objects (space or quantity) but more generally as the science of necessary
reasoning. Again, this is a wider use of “mathematics” than we are used to. Indeed, for
Peirce, all a priori reasoning – both our everyday practice of “necessary reasoning” and
the  more  rigorous  practice  of  professional  mathematicians  –  counts  as  part  of
mathematics.9 Now,  if  “formal  logic  is  nothing  but  mathematics  applied  to  logic”
(4.263; cf. 3.615), there is more to mathematical logic than mathematics, and that is
precisely logic. Hence the real opposition between logic and mathematics lies between
the theoretical or observational aspect of inference, on the one hand, and its practical
or operational part on the other. The mathematician practises deduction (2.532, 4.239,
4.124 and 4.242), reasons deductively, whereas the logician studies deductive reasonings
and arguments. In the footsteps of his father, Peirce characterises mathematics as “the
science which draws necessary conclusions” (3.558 and 4.229), while logic, by contrast,
is  “the  science  of  drawing  necessary  conclusions.”  This,  incidentally,  makes
mathematics a “pre-logical science” which is in no need of logic, for a theory of the
validity of its arguments: those are acritical and evident, “more evident than any such
(logical) theory could be” (2.120).10 Hence, the respective aims and methods of logic and
mathematics  are  very  different:  Peirce’s  apparent  anti-logicism  should  rather  be
interpreted as a difference of attitude according to the position that is being adopted.
From the mathematician’s standpoint, the instrumental value of the calculus is decisive,
because he is only interested in finding the simplest and shortest way to get to the
result  (4.239). Logical  constructions  are  superfluous  here  (3.222). But  from  the
logician’s  point  of  view,  it  should  be  clear  that  his  end  “is  simply  and  solely  the
investigation of the theory of logic, and not at all the construction of a calculus to aid
the drawing of inferences” (4.373). Therefore, the mathematician’s and the logician’s
purposes are incompatible. The calculus is an important tool of reasoning, but it is only a
tool (3.322,  3.364,  4.424  and  4.553),  or  a  “special  system  of  symbols”  for  treating
deductive  logic.  When  Peirce  criticises  logicians  like  Boole  and  Schröder  for  being
excessively mathematical, it is because they attempt to draw metaphysical conclusions
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from logical calculi whose merit consists in the ease with which calculations can be
performed with them, rather than in their ability to reveal the semantic structure of
arguments  and propositions.11 But  he  is  also  convinced  of  the  possible  plurality  of
symbolic systems, applied to deduction itself, and above all of the superiority of his
logical graphs compared to an algebra of logic (4.617. See Engel-Tiercelin 1991a: 190). In
other words, the logician is not interested in reaching conclusions, but in theories about
their relations to premisses (4.239, 4.370, 4.481 and 4.533). Hence the natural purpose of
logic is “to analyze reasoning and see what it consists in” (2.532).
9 The business of logic lying in the “analysis and theory of reasoning,” (4.134. Cf. 1.417,
4.242 and 4.373) this has decisive consequences. It means first that the realm of logic is
widened  so  as  to  cover  not  only  deductive reasonings  but  inductive and  abductive
seasonings as well; this is crucial for understanding Peirce’s conception of logical and
scientific inquiry. It also means that the aim of analysis as opposed to that of a calculus
will be guided not by simplicity but, on the contrary, by complexity (as may be seen
from the numerous steps involved in the graphic presentation), in order to reach the
most basic and irreducible elements.  It  is  precisely here that semiotic gets into the
picture, for the business of semiotic is to explain “the gist” (2.532) or the “essence of
reasoning,”  through the  various  functions  exhibited  by  different  signs,  in  order  to
discover  the  nature  of  arguments  (1.575  and  4.425).  Again,  that  logic  should  be
concerned with reasoning makes it, more and more, a normative science (1. 577), and
even a branch of ethics (1.611, 1.573, 1.575, 5.35 and 5.130), for every reasoning is the
product  of  a  deliberate  and  self-controlled  thought  (1.606;  5.130)  “with  a  view  to
making it conform to a purpose or ideal” (1.573). Logical criticism should apply to that 
type of reasoning alone; this is also a consequence of the principles of pragmatism,
according to which all thinking is a kind of conduct (5.534), so that reasoning is a kind
of  deliberate  conduct,  for  which  a  man  can  be  held  responsible.  Such  a  normative
conception of  reasoning is  particularly decisive to understand the basic  features of
Peirce’s theory of assertion as well as the principles governing inductive and abductive
reasonings in the methods of scientific inquiry. (1.615) Finally, and not surprisingly,
such a definition of logic as a science of reasoning implies an appeal of some sort to
psychology. But, more precisely, in what sense?
⁂
10 Peirce’s views on psychology and its relationship to logic are often taken to be, not only
complex,  but  “puzzling,  confusing,  sometimes  paradoxical,  sometimes  apparently
contradictory” (Cadwallader 1975: 184). Indeed, “On the one hand Peirce often said that
logic was not based on psychology and constantly criticized logicians who based their
logic on psychology […].12 On the other hand Peirce seemed to contradict himself, for he
also made statements which appear to say that logic should be based upon psychology.”
13 Cadwallader’s  hypothesis  “to  account  for  this  apparent  contradiction  in  Peirce’s
statements concerning logic and psychology has two components. The first involves a
distinction between facts and theories of psychology, a distinction he pointed to in the
Minute  Logic (2.210).  The  second,  also  noted  in  the  Minute  Logic,  involved  the
reconceptualization  of  the  classification  of  the  sciences.  Both  components  seem
necessary to clarify Peirce’s views on the relationship between logic and psychology”
(Cadwallader 1975: 184-5). This is true to a large extent, but somewhat more complex
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too (see Tiercelin 1993a:  29-41,  and 2006:  184).  Six  aspects  of  his  position,  at  least,
should be considered. In a nutshell:
11 1) First of all, it is undeniable, as Cadwallader was one of the first scholars to analyze in
detail (1975: 168ff), that, throughout his entire life “Peirce wove psychology into all of
his interests.” In 1898, he noted that his “interest in philosophy grew out of his intense
curiosity  about  cosmology  and  psychology”  (4.2).  “In  fact,  at  one-point  –  when he
apparently was putting pressure on President Gilman of Johns Hopkins to grant him a
salary  increase  and  perhaps  to  give  him  the  unfilled  chair  in  ‘mental  science,’  as
William James once referred to it (Fisch & Cope 1952: 363) – Peirce threatened to resign
his position at Hopkins and said, ‘Upon leaving the University I shall bid adieu to the
study  of  Logic  and  Philosophy  (except  experimental  psychology)’  (ibid.:  279),”  (see
Cadwallader 1975: 166-7.)14
12 2) As can be seen from his very early texts, Peirce was absolutely against psychologism
in logic, if it meant that logic should be based on or derived from any psychology in the
(mainly Anglo-Scottish or German) sense of introspection, association, intuition, sense
data,  consciousness,  Gefühl,  faculties,  etc.15 Generally  speaking,  the  gist  of  the  1868
Papers is to ruin all the Cartesian and Lockean myths of intuition, introspection and
“inwardness,”  the  so-called  foundationalist  value  of  first  principles,  to  show  the
irrelevance of a distinction between the internal and the external views of the mind,
and to develop a basically externalist (inferential) conception of sensations, emotions
and cognition in general, which is very close to what Wittgenstein will later on develop
(Tiercelin 1993a, 1993b, 2000, 2005a and 2012) and will be more and more positively
enhanced by Peirce, both on the epistemological and metaphysical levels, through his
social conception of logic and his dispositional account of mental properties (Tiercelin
1993a,  1993b,  2005a).16 Peirce  was  very  much opposed to  the  German introspective
tradition based on such criteria as self-evidence or to their view that the ultimate test
of  valid  inference  is  an  immediate,  instinctive  feeling  of  rationality.  Sigwart  is
associated with such a “Gefühl-criterion” (5. 85, 2. 232, 2. 210, 5. 329), as is Schröder (one
of Sigwart’s followers, according to Peirce (5.85)), who defines “logical consequence as
a compulsion of thought” (3.432; original emphasis). Peirce also refuted the view, made
popular  by  Stuart  Mill,  that  logic-theoretic  grounds  were  wholly  borrowed  from
psychology: “Logic is not the science of how we do think; but in such sense as it can be
said to deal with thinking at all, it only determines how we ought to think; nor how we
ought to think in conformity with usage, but how we ought to think in order to think
what is true” (2.52; original emphasis). In so doing, Sigwart “escapes the necessity of
founding  logic  upon the  theory  of  cognition.  By  the  theory  of  cognition  is  usually
meant  an  explanation  of  the  possibility  of  knowledge  drawn  from  principles  of
psychology […] it is indeed a vicious circle to make logic rest upon a theory of cognition
so understood” (3.432). Pearson was to be later on accused too of holding a theory of
cognition “in which he fell into the too common error of confounding psychology with
logic” (8.144.  See Cadwallader 1975:  184-5).  In other words,  knowing how the mind
works has no place in logic: “I contend that that propedeutic that is wanted for logic
has  no  more  to  do  with  the  psychological  theory  of  cognition  than  logic  itself  is
concerned with the psychical process of thinking. Even less if there were room for less”
(2.63). So, by contrast with the “German theory of logic,” supposing a non-cognitive
faculty as final authority, Peirce claimed his linkage with the “English” or “objective
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conception of logic” (2.185), which made the criterion of logicality state the condition
of its own testing (2.153. See Tiercelin 1993a: 56-118).
13 3) However such anti-psychologism did not imply that certain facts of psychology had
not to be taken into account, nor that Peirce would have been that hostile to a kind of
project such as Dewey’s, of a “natural history of thought” (cf. Dewey 1904: 220). On the
contrary, Peirce found it necessary, both, not to use the “untrustworthy” psychology of
introspection  and  to  verify,  for  instance,  that  the  deduction  of  categories  was  in
keeping with “empirical psychology,” as he writes in “On a New List of Categories”
(1.545-559).17 If “all attempts to ground the fundamentals of logic on psychology are
seen to be essentially shallow” (5.28), psychological information can be useful (2.710).
“Logic does rest upon certain facts of experience among which are facts about men, but
not  upon  any  theory  about  human  mind  or  any  theory  to  explain  facts”  (5.110).
However,  as  has  been  noted,  the  matter  was  made  more  complex,  about  1902,  by
Peirce’s  reconceptualization  of  some  of the  sciences  and  their  interrelationships”
(Cadwallader 1975: 184; and Calcaterra 2006: 41-3). More on this below.
14 4) It  is  quite clear that Peirce had nothing against experimental psychology (in the
sense of Wundt or Fechner),18 of which he was himself (even before W. James)19 an actor
(Cadwallader 1975: 173), 20 and which he never gave up (Fisch & Cope 1952: 292).21 
15 5) In order to understand the complexity of Peirce’s position on psychology and, in
particular, on the presence of both (often taken as contradictory), transcendental, or
idealistic or normative elements on the one hand, and naturalistic elements on the
other  hand,22 it  is  also  decisive  to  realize  that  Peirce  developed  a  very  original
conception (partly inherited from his interpretation of the theories of evolution) of
normativity and of the relations between norms and nature which allowed him to see
logical laws and norms more as emerging from nature than as radically distinct from it,
in the sense of a kind of natural logic and thereby to avoid, both subjective idealism and
reductive naturalism (Tiercelin 1997). A few brief remarks are here in order. 
16 1. First, it is true that Peirce is prone to a mixture of idealistim and naturalistim, as can
be  seen,  for  example,  in  his  evolutionary  cosmology,  which  has some  strongly
Schellingian  accents,  reminiscent  of  the  fact  that  he  was  “born  and  reared  in  the
neighborhood of Concord, at the time when Emerson, Hedge, and their friends were
disseminating the ideas that they caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus,
from Boehm, or from God knows what minds stricken with the monstruous mysticism
of the East” (6.10). Peirce admits that “some cultured bacilli, some benignant form of
the disease was implanted in (his) soul, unawares, and that now, after long incubation,
it  comes  to  the  surface,  modified  by  mathematical  conceptions  and  by  training  in
physical investigations.” In such a project, ethical and religious considerations seem
often  to  be  on  the  same  footing  as  logical  or  epistemological  considerations.
Cosmological  speculations  finally  culminate  in  an  evolutionary  ideal,  the  course  of
evolution being described as “the growth of concrete reasonableness.” Peirce evokes
the power or efficacy of ideas (1.213), going so far as to say that there are “ideas in
nature which determine the existence of the objects” (1.213). The growth of reason is
seen as  that  of  the  Summum Bonum achieved through an esthetic  contemplation of
nature  (1.615).  Matter  is  “effete  mind.”  Again,  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  the
introduction of tychism – the element of chance and indeterminacy (or firstness) in
Nature  –,  in  Peirce’s  synechistic  (or  continuous)  metaphysics,  is  his  opposition  to
materialism: one must prevent mind from being reduced to a simple illusion of the
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material system (6. 61), which is often directly linked to religious ideas (6.613, 6.61 and
4. 611. See also Tiercelin 1997: 37).
17 2. However, it would be completely inaccurate to underestimate Peirce’s intention to
build  a  scientific metaphysics,  namely, 23 not  so  much  to  follow  a  systematic  or
architectonic  model  (6.  604-608),  or  an  empiricist  model,  or  particular  rules  and
methods,  but  rather,  a  form  of  life  and  duty:  to  reach  the  idea,  by  pursuing  a
disinterested life devoted to inquiry, that reality does exist, is as it is, independently of
what anyone may think of it, although everyone is destined to discover it sooner or
later, so long as he is rational, and places his efforts within those of a community of
research:  Reality (and  its  discovery)  is  the  central  concept  of  Peirce’s  scientific  and 
realistic  metaphysics,  thus  inseparable  from  some  normative vision  of  rationality
(Tiercelin 1997: 38).
18 3. Such a normative vision is precisely conceived as an ideal,  an intellectual hope to
reach,  through  the  categories  displayed  by  logic,  a  better  understanding  of  what
Cournot called “the idea of the order and reason of things” (1975, Tome II, Ch. XXV:
476);  “Every attempt to understand anything – every research supposes,  or at  least
hopes that  the very objects  of  study themselves  are  subject  to  a  logic  more or  less
identical  with that  which we employ” (6.189).  In that  respect,  and importantly,  for
Peirce, the only appeal that seems to be made to psychology remains subordinated to
the categories,  i.e.,  to logic.  Hence, even if  it  is true that “the only possible way to
explain the laws of nature and uniformity in general is to suppose that they are the
result  of  evolution,”  and  that  “an  evolutionary  philosophy  of  some  kind  must  be
accepted”  (6.604),  yet,  Peirce’s  cosmology  or  rather  cosmogony  (6.33)  must  remain
formal  enough  and  keep  away  from  of  any  clearcut  or  reductionistic  form  of
naturalism.  In other words,  if  one is  rational  enough,  and scientifically  minded,  he
cannot fail, in the long run, to discover that reality is such as it is, namely, the growth
of some concrete reasonableness which is finally following the action of love (agapism),
the Golden Rule (6.288):
The agapastic development of thought is the adoption of certain mental tendencies,
not altogether heedlessly,  as in tychasm, nor quite blindly by the mere force of
circumstances or of logic, as in anancasm, but by an immediate attraction for the
idea itself, whose nature is divined before the mind possesses it, by the power of
sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of mind. (6.307) 
19 Hence, Peirce’s metaphysics leads, very naturally, to the idea of a living cosmos, mind
and matter being viewed in a monistic way: “The one intelligible theory of the universe
is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws” (6.25). The universe is not like the one described by the mechanists: it is
animated by final causes, worked from within by concrete reasonableness. However,
radical  indeterminacy  remains  the  dominant  character  of  evolution.  “Hence,  the
essence of reason is such that its being can never be achieved. It must always be in a
state of beginning, of growth” (1.615. See also Tiercelin 1997: 40-1).
20 4. This is how the law of habit becomes the law of mind. Which means that, to a certain
extent, the laws of logic are indeed a product of evolution, which is itself the growth of
concrete reasonableness. And yet, logic and norms are not reduced nor reductible to
nature. Why and how?
21 Precisely because of Peirce’s very subtle conception of norms and rationality, worked
out at length24 and integrated into the doctrine of the so-called normative sciences,
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which are part and parcel of science itself (5.39).25 Logic being a normative science,
makes it a particular problem of ethics, in turn, dependent upon esthetics (2.197), since
the basic problem of ethics is not right or wrong, but “what I am deliberately ready to
accept, as the statement of what I want to do” (2.198), which makes it a science of ends.
Logic  thus,  very naturally,  depends on it,  since it  too has to do with thinking as a
deliberate  activity  and  with  the  means  to  reach  that  end  which  is  a  valid  well
conducted  reasoning.  This  explains  why  it  is  “impossible  to  be  completely  and
rationally  logical  except  on  an  ethical  basis”  (2.198),  and  why,  too,  both  logic  and
ethics, in turn, depend on esthetics, which is the analysis of the end itself, and of the
ideal one would be willing to accept and to conform to. Perfectly in keeping with the
pragmaticist  theory  of  inquiry  and  with  the  view  of  reasoning  as  “thinking  in  a
controlled and deliberate way” (1.573), logic is but “the theory of the establishment of
stable  beliefs”  and “the  theory of  deliberate  thought.”  There  can be  good and bad
reasonings which may be submitted to criticism, for which we may be held responsible,
since they are deliberate and controlled, and since, for a pragmatist, the way one thinks
cannot be distinguished from the way one conducts oneself (5.534), thus from the way
one is guided by a purpose or an ideal (1.573), i.e., that of the discovery of reality. Now,
“being deliberately ready to adopt the believed formula as a guide for action” (5.27)
must lead one less to a search for origin than to the determination of the norms and
ideals that are to be chosen for the future conduct (5.35; 5.461), – which, incidentally,
means that rationality should not be reduced to action nor to its practical consequences,
for such a determination reuires an endless exercise of self-criticism, becoming itself a
kind of habit: “If conduct is completely deliberate, the ideal must be a habit of feeling
which  has  developed under  the  influence  of  all  a  series  of  criticisms  and  hetero-
criticisms; and the theory of deliberate formation of such habits of feelings is what
should be meant by esthetics” (1.574).
22 There  is  indeed  “a  deep  line  of  thinking”  (Tiercelin  1997:  43)  in  such  a  Peircian
conception of logic as a normative science, resting in the end on ethics and esthetics: if
the phenomena of reasoning are, finally, in their basic traits, parallel to those of moral
conduct,  it  is,  because  “reasoning  is,  essentially,  just  as  moral  conduct,  a  thought
submitted to self-control” (1.606), is indeed, a reasoning (and not a mere inference) in
so far as it follows rules or norms which we are able to judge, approve or disapprove.
And yet,  it  forces  upon us,  which suggests  that  there  is,  in  the  norms themselves,
something  irresistible,  which  seems  self-evident,  as  if  they  were  imperatives  or
prescriptions which we follow, while lacking mere deontological power. Indeed, on the
one hand, it looks as if the laws of logic do not owe their normativity to the existence of
some type of special facts, of the laws of Being-True, describing some reality of which
they would be indicative truths.  On the other hand, the laws of logic are not mere
psychological features of a system of beliefs which an agent has: rather, to claim that
logical norms are normative means they belong to norms of rationality, that they are
the rules that must be followed by an ideally rational agent; hence it is not so much a
feature that a system of belief or an agent does in fact have, as a trait that governs our
interpretation of a system of rational beliefs and behaviours of individuals. In other
words,  if  we did  not  suppose  that  a  subject  or  agent  had some traits  of  “optimal”
rationality, we could not interpret him. In that sense, rationality is not a datum, a given,
an empirical fact which we could discover or not in a creature. It does not follow that
we could not describe some creatures (humans, animals, machines) as being more or
less  rational  or  irrational.  But  even then,  our  various  ascriptions  of  rationality  are
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relative  to  the  norms of  rationality  which  we  accept:  logical  norms are  inferential
norms, governing what we can expect an agent to believe, if he has certain beliefs (for
example,  that  he  has  no  contradictory  beliefs.  See  Tiercelin  1997:  44-5).  Such  an
account teaches something important about Peirce’s views on logic, psychology, norms
and nature. In defining logic as the theory of the establishement of stable beliefs and as
a normative science, Peirce shows that logic is concerned as much with beliefs and
norms as it is with logical truths, thus avoiding both a straightforward Platonist (or
Fregean) position and a psychologistic or naturalistic one.
23 In terms close to what Quine,  Davidson or Dennett have now made familiar,  Peirce
takes it that we most often adopt a principle of charity, according to which the agent
whom we interpret, has beliefs which are, according to our own standards, in general,
true. Norms are due to the very truth of the agent’s beliefs – otherwise, one could not
understand their functioning as norms, namely, that they seem to have some kind of
necessity (and self-evidence). In that respect, truth is not only a descriptive property of
a statement or of a belief, it is also a normative property:26 the fact that someone has a
belief presupposes that one accepts such a belief as true, even if that belief turns out to
be  false.  This  close  link  between belief  and  truth  –  which  was  well  formulated  by
Moore’s paradox: one cannot say “I believe that p but p is false” – is expressed by Peirce
when he stresses that it is somewhat redundant to say p is true and to believe that p.27
As a consequence, the rationality of a system of beliefs obeying logical norms is not for
Peirce a fact:  neither a transcendent fact,  in a Fregean sense, nor a natural fact,  as
psychologists think, when they try (cf. Mill or Bain) to reduce the laws of thought to the
laws of human psychology and the latter to natural laws. Being norms, logical truths
and rules cannot be deduced from or reduced to factual propositions bearing on the
nature or  constitution of  individuals.  However,  their  being so  “irresistible”  or  self-
evident  is  explained  by  evolution:  it  is  so  because  they  are  the  product  of  certain
mental habits or dispositions which are the product of evolution, of that long history of
interactions with our cultural peers, punctuated by habit-changes, through which they
finally  became  reinforced  or  strenghtened.  This  also  explains  why  there  is  only  a
gradation between a “cerebral” habit, a belief, and a full-fledged judgement, why, in
the long run, such habits which are “the logician maintains, […] all adapted to an end,
that of carrying belief” (3.161) become identical for everyone, and finally come to play
a  normative  role,  by  detaching  themselves  from what  has  been  previously  believed
(3.160-361). Briefly put, although the logical laws find their origin in mental operations,
they rest on psychological acts which acquire, in relation to their origin, an autonomy
and independence which detach them from it,  and enable them to play the role of
leading principles of the conduct of reasoning. At a certain time in inquiry, one no
longer cares about knowing how one came to certain conclusions by such and such
inferential acts (1.56). In that respect, our logical beliefs may well be the product of
evolution and come from feelings of approval or disapproval which we feel after a long
history of relationships with our peers.  However, from the fact that such a general
capacity to have referential systems and to approve them (or to view them as norms)
has grown, (“we outgrow the applicability of instinct”) it does not follow that one may
derive the content of the inferential rules themselves from some evolutionary history.
As far as such rules state certain ideals of thought and action, their origin becomes
opaque, and it is such opacity which constitutes their normativity and rationality.
24 I hope Peirce’s conception of logic is now clearer and that we understand better both
its  relation  to  psychology  and  the  nature  of  Peirce’s  supposed  radical
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“antipsychologism.” Indeed, logic is neither a science which would or could describe
directly the processes of natural reasoning, as if one could merely transpose the rules of
logic  on the level  of  psychology,  nor a  science able  to codify anything which were
totally distinct from the steps of reasoning, as if logic were a pure abstract game of
arbitrary rules. In that respect, Peirce avoids deriving the logical contents from some
acts of  the mind (and would consequently oppose,  a straightforward naturalistic  or
evolutionary account of rationality or logic), but he also avoids a Fregean type position
whose major well known difficulty is to leave unexplained the way in which logic can
simply be applied.
25 6) The sixth element which helps us to make our ideas clearer about Peirce’s complex
views on such issues is also an important one. As a matter of fact, Peirce thought that,
for Kant and most writers of the classical age, it was not so decisive to separate logic
from psychology, inso far as, for them, logic, viewed as “the science of the forms of
thought  in  general”  was,  despite  its  ambiguities,  hardly  different  from  “a  logical
analysis of the products of thought” (W1: 306 and MS 726). He always insists on relying
on what is classically referred to (e.g. by Kant) as either “psychology proper” or as the
“physiology of  the mind” (1.579),  “meaning an account of  how the mind functions,
develops, and decays, together with the explanation of all this by motions and changes
of the brain” (8.303) to throw light on such phenomena as doubt, habit and belief and
he even calls the general science of signs a “physiology of forms” (MS 478). Habit, “a
general  rule  operating in the organism” (W4:  249)  was indeed a  concept  of  central
concern to Peirce not only in his famous 1878 paper “How to make our ideas clear”
(5.388: 410), which demonstrates how habit is “the very market place of psychology”
(7.367), but also how psychology (covering habit, doubt, belief, sensation, emotion, the
various kinds of (abductive, inductive, deductive) inferences, but also the physiological
analyses of habit, that “general rule operating in the organism” (5.594 and W4:39), of
“protoplasm,”  of  the  various  stimulus  to  action,  to  perception  together  with  the
psychology of learning) is fully integrated into pragmatism, and throughout Peirce’s
life  (Cadwallader  1975:  170),  as  the  1891-93  Monist series  (“The  Law  of  Mind”
(6.102-163), “Man’s Glassy Essence” (6.238-271)), or his unpublished Grand Logic (1893)
and the 1898 Cambridge Lectures (7.468-517) clearly show. 
26 As a consequence, one may safely conclude that Peirce’s antipsychologism never went
so far as to deny all facts of psychology. On the contrary, since logic is a positive science
– contrary to mathematics, which is a science of pure hypotheses – it may, or even must,
take  into  account  certain  facts  (such as  doubts,  beliefs,  etc.)  or  certain  indubitable
observations concerning mind: “Formal logic must not be too purely formal; it must
represent  a  fact  of  psychology,  or  else  it  is  in  danger  of  degenerating  into  a
mathematical  recreation”  (2.710.  See  Tiercelin  1991a:  191).  However,  if  such
observations are indeed psychological, they must not be interpreted as observations to
be made only by empirical or experimental psychology. They pertain to our everyday
phenomenology or, rather, “phaneroscopy.” Indeed, “they come within the range of
every man's normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life”
(1.241), and are such that they constitute “the universal data of experience that we
cannot suppose a man not to know and yet to be making inquiries” (4.116). Among
these universal data is the fact that every reasoning is governed by an aim (“holds out
some  expectation”  (2.153)), proceeds  by  iconic  constructions,  and  assumes  certain
belief-habits which operate like leading principles or rules of inference, etc. Otherwise,
logic  would  be  confined  to  a  grammar  limited  not  only  to  abnormal  but  to  non-
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scientific  or  irrational  men  (5.438-63  and  5.502-37). Thus,  when  Peirce  claims  the
possibility and the duty for logic to account for such psychological facts, it is because
“under an appeal to psychology is not meant every appeal to any fact relating to the
mind” (2.210).28
⁂
27 After sketching the basic components of Peire’s views on logic and psychology, which,
hopefully  help  to  clarify  Peirce’s  complex  attitude  towards  psychologism  and
antipsychologism in logic, I would like to suggest, briefly, as a conclusion, how and why
such an original approach has positive impacts and is still relevant today. Indeed it is
because of such a wide-ranging definition of such concepts as logic, psychology, but
also normativity, rationality, nature, habit or mind, that Peirce considered he had the
right tools to conduct original inquiries in several areas:
28 1. In logic and semiotic, first, Peirce went through the analysis of the various kinds of
signs involved in reasoning and of the various modes of inference. From 1867 until the
end, Peirce considered that the various analyses of Semiotic should take account of
three levels (terms, propositions, arguments), this level being itself decomposed, for
terms, into icons, indices and symbols, for propositions, into true, false and doubtful,
for arguments into deductions, inductions and abductions, while admitting that “the
relation between subject and predicate, or antecedent and consequent, is essentially
the same as that between premises and conclusion” (4.3) so that, finally, the distinction
between terms, propositions and arguments turned out to be less false than useless,
(2.407n1 and 3.175) since the basic relation was the illative relation (CP 3.175 and CP
2.44n1).  On the three types of inferences,  and in particular on abduction (Tiercelin
1993b, 2005b), and deduction (see Hintikka 1980 for his famous distinction between the
corollarial  and  the  theorematic),  the  importance  and  relevance  of  diagrammatic
reasoning  and  of  formal  images  or  icons  in  deduction,29 Peirce  made  fantastic
contributions:  by  stressing  the  structural  (and  not  only  psychological)  necessity  of
icons in reasoning, he showed a fundamental aspect of deduction, often omitted by the
cognitivistic models inspired by a Fregean-Russellian view of logic; namely, that our
reasonings are structurally governed by semantical rules, and that it is thanks to such
rules  that  people  build  what  Ph. Johnson-Laird  (1983)  calls  “mental  models”  of  the
premisses,  and look for  models  of  the  conclusion (Tiercelin  1991a:  61-4,  and 1995).
Again, Peirce’s concern with iconic procedures in reasoning is also related to his effort
to think of  formal  logic  within a  semiotic  which remains sensitive to  the semantic
(symbolic and iconic)  aspects of  logic,  thus entertaining the possibility of  an iconic
logic  (Hintikka 1980)  and stressing the necessity  of  associating symbolic  and iconic
procedures  (see  Peirce’s  efforts  towards  a  graphical  or  algebraical  presentation  of
formal logic). Hene a fine balance between some connexionist views of cognition – the
account of  the formal structures of  perception,  of  icons,  of  the importance of  slow
thinking – and a rather classical cognitivist approach – his criticism of associationism,
of images conceived as pictures, his account of representation within the framework of
a  mental  language,  etc.  Peirce  seems to  have  been aware  of  one  of  the  still  major
concerns in cognitive science: how to find a third way, mid-way between a classical
symbolic account and a connexionist view, finally too close from associationism, which,
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while bringing a remedy to their respective defects, would be able to reconcile both
approaches (Tiercelin 1995)?
29 2. Peirce quickly realized too what a revolution the medievals had accomplished in the
domain of the reflexions between thought and language, and that it was in their works
(more, finally than in Locke’s representationism)30 that he was most likely to find the
rhetorical means he needed to work out what he had himself called, following, beside
the  medievals,  the inspiration  of  both  Kant  and Boole,31 a  “logical  analysis  of  the
products of thought.”32 The scholastics too had “the habit of thinking in signs” and
knew that thought “is of the same general nature” as a sign, as Peirce wrote in 1871
about Ockham in the Frazer’s Review of the Works of Berkeley (W2: 472): hence a possible
extension  of  the  sphere  of  logic  from  the  too  narrow  Kantian  and  psychologically
ambiguous  sphere  of  “concepts”  to  symbols  (W2:  56),  a  fine  distinction  between
Grammar (and the traps of ordinary language) and logic (W2: 56), so as to avoid “any
intrusion of  the  psychological  in  the  logical”  (W1:  164)  and the  ambiguities  of  the
Kantian “faculties,” while preserving the benefits of a Formal Grammar which Peirce
never  objected  to  identify  with  “an  art  of  judging,”  with  Kant’s  Transcendentale
Elementarlehre,  with  an  Erkenntnisstheorie  or  even  with  epistemology  (2.206.  See
Tiercelin 2006:  163-4):33 a  confirmation that  Peirce’s  antipsychologism was never as
strong  as  Frege’s  or  Wittgenstein’s:  at  least,  it  did  not  imply  that  the  theory  of
knowledge should be discredited because of  its  compromissions with psychology.  If
Peirce abandoned the issues about the foundations or origins of knowledge, it was to
concentrate on the problem of its justification.34 How is synthetical judgment in general
possible? On what is grounded the validity of the laws of logic? In leaving to a Formal
Grammar  the  task  to  analyze  the  relation  between  thought  and  meaning,  Peirce
followed the Modistic inspiration, and announced, in a way, Husserl. But, contrary to
Husserl, if such a Grammar was to study what must be true of all the representamen in
order  that  they  may  embody  meaning  (2.229),  it  did  not  concern  the  mind  as
consciousness (were it transcendental), but thought in general. 
30 3. Finally, if Peirce’s sophisticated analyses are still so relevant today, it is because of
the wide ranging model of the mind they suggest, not only through the thought-sign
theory, but more generally, through a naturalistic though non reductionist approach of
intelligence, normativity and rationality, mind and matter, norms and nature. Indeed,
it is crucial to see what the neutrality of the new model of the mind allows: If it is true
that “thought and expression are all one” (1.349), “so that it appears that every species
of  actual  cognition  is  of  the  nature  of  a  sign,”  then  “it  will  be  found  highly
advantageous to consider the subject from this point of view, because many general
properties of signs can be discovered by a set of words and the like which are free from
the intricacies which perplex us in the direct study of thought” (7.356).
31 It is just as crucial to see that mind, for Peirce, is never reduced to a first person point
of view: consciousness is superfluous, subjectivity is synonym of mystery (“man’s glassy
essence”), of error (5.313), and incompatible with logic being grounded in the social
principle.35 Like Parfit, Peirce believes that survival counts more than identity, or that
identity is as much present in one’s books than in one’s petty self or any physiological
unity (7.584-5): it is a unity of symbolization (7.592-594), public and not private (7.592).
The  adoption  of  such  an  external  or  a  third  person  stance  (which  has,  at  times,
functionalist  accents  and  is  not  far  either  frome  some  Dennettian  remarks  on
“intentional  systems”)  explains  why  Peirce  took  very  seriously  the  hypothesis  of
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thinking machines36 (while pointing the limits of such a model too), and also considered
that “thought is not necessarilly connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees,
of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world, and one can no more deny that it
is really there, than that the colours, the shapes, etc of objects are really there” (4.551).
Mind  cannot  be  reduced  to  the  brain  (see  Peirce’s  ironical  remarks  on  the  the
psychologists’ s attempt to reduce mental states to purely neurological states (7.366)): it
is exemplified by Thirdness, or a triadic relation (1.537), i.e. a relation which, contrary
to a rude dyadic relation such as is proper to the phenomena of automatic regulation
(1.220  and  5.473),  involves  some meaning  (1.343  and  8.331),  intentionality,  or  final
causation  (1.269  and  1.538),  thus  showing  the  inexhaustible  character  of  meaning
(1.343), a category which is precisely wide enough not to be limited to the human mind
(as the example of the sunflower testifies, which is a purely generic manifestation of
nature itself). Peirce took the natural/artificial distinction to be just as inadequate as
the mind/matter distinction. Indeed, “what we call matter is not completely dead but is
merely hidebound with habits” (6.158).37 Thus there is no need to see a basic difference
between  a  machine  that  works  upon  a  logical  design  and  an  instrument  of
experimentation such as a cucurbit: both are the same in so far as they are instruments
of thought –  that is to say as soon as we consider what they are intended for. Hence
there is no difference in nature but only in degree between simple instruments that
may  be  held  as  mere  continuations  of  organic  activity  and  such  perfectionate
mechanisms,  which  we  are  perhaps  too  quick  in  judging  revolutionary  or  raising
fundamentally new problems concerning the mental. 
32 Even if one is at times tempted to take such views as deeply idealistic,  they should
rather be taken, as I  have shown elsewhere (Tiercelin 1998b),  as part and parcel of
Peirce’s deep metaphysical conviction of an affinity between mind and nature (6.307
and 6.315), which it might be worth while exploring further through some more recent
models such as the ones provided by Ellis, where logical principles as mere rational
idealizations of our systems of beliefs, (Ellis 1979; see Tiercelin 1997) or the various
teleosemantic projects (Millikan 1984; and Dretske 1988. See Tiercelin 1998a). But to a
certain extent too, the most faithful (and maybe also the most insightful) model Peirce
was trying to pursue was the one which Murphey already suggested (1961: 46),  and
which  was  also  put  forward  by  Nozick  (1997:  112),  namely,  the  “middle  course”
suggested (but abandoned by Kant) as an explanation of the links between our logical
categories and the domain of  empirical  experience.  Indeed,  this  might explain why
Peirce could feel he was the spiritual son of Kant: for Kant was a “somewhat confused
pragmatist,” and “the thing in itself” was “something to abjure from the bottom of
one’s  heart.”  But  all  the  same:  Kant  had  seen  “the  inseparable  link  which  exists
between  rational  knowledge  and  rational  finality”  (5.412).  So  why  not  follow  his
suggestion of  a  “system of  preformation of  pure  reason” a  system which,  mid-way
between a purely empiricist and an a priori starting point, might nicely explain how
intelligible norms can somehow emerge from our empirical nature? I offer this as a
possible clue to Peirce’s description of his own intellectual development as that of “a
pure Kantian,” who was simply forced “by successive steps,” into Pragmaticism.
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NOTES
1. The following abbreviations will  be used in this article for Peirce’s works: CP, followed by
volume and paragraph number, stands for Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,  ed. Charles
Hartshorne,  Paul  Weiss,  and  Arthur  W. Burks,  8  vols.,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  Harvard  University
Press,  1931-58;  W,  followed  by  volume and  page  number,  for  Writings  of  Charles  S.  Peirce:  A
Chronological  Edition,  8  vols.,  ed.  Peirce Edition Project,  Indianapolis,  Indiana University Press,
1982-2010;  MS,  followed  by  manuscript  number  and  page  number,  for  the  unpublished
manuscripts  in  the Houghton Library of  Harvard University,  as  catalogued in  Richard  Robin’s
Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press,
1967, and “The Peirce Papers. A Supplementary Catalogue,” Transactions of the Charles S.  Peirce
Society 7, no. 1, 1971. References preceded by NEM are to Peirce’s New Elements of Mathematics ed.
by C. Eisele, Mouton, The Hague, 1976, 4 vols., by volume, tome and page number.
2. “There is indeed no consensus among philosophers as to what psychologism amounts to,” M.
Kusch notes (1995: 5) who identifies no less than eleven psychologistic schools for the period
1866-1931 in Germany (1995: 93-119).
3. I have tried to do this on several occasions. See in particular Tiercelin 1984, 1985, 1986, 1991a,
1991b, (1993a: 27-118) and (1993b: 14-28). 
4. “Always separate sharply the logical from the psychological, the objective from the subjective”
(Frege 1884: x).
5. For a good account of Peirce’s approach to quantification, see Martin 1980; and Thibaud (1975:
84ff).
6. Cf.  1.192, 1.227, 1.444, 1.529, 2.93, 2.227, 4.9,  6.129 and 5.488. On Peirce’s insistence on the
“formal” character of semiotics, see NEM IV: 20-1 and 54.
7. Engel-Tiercelin 1985; see also Burks (1943: 188).
8. Tiercelin 1991a, 1991b and (1995: 37-8). 
9. Hence,  any  proposition  can  be  looked upon  as  a  mathematical  theory  and  used  for
mathematical  reasoning.  Therefore  philosophy may be  rendered mathematical  (MS 438).  See
Hookway (1985: 182ff).
10. For a good account of the acritical character of mathematics, see Hookway (1985: 183ff).
11. Peirce  was  not  himself  completely  immune  from  the  Platonism  which  he  denounced,
especially in his philosophy of arithmetics. There would be a lot to say here about the way Peirce
uses his Scotistic realism as a better candidate than Platonism for a convincing realistic approach
to mathematics. See Tiercelin 1993c, and 2010.
12. E.g : “logic does not rest upon psychology either much or little” (Ms. 633), “my principles
absolutely debar me from making the least use of psychology in logic” (65.157), and “the Logician
is  forbidden to  appeal  for  support  to  Psychology Proper”  (Ms.  645).  “Sigwart  […]  makes  the
fundamental  mistake  of  confounding  the  logical  question  with  the  psychological  question”
(5.85). See also Peirce’s frequent criticisms of J. S. Mill – e.g., 2.47.
13. Cadwallader (1975: 184-5): “Thus, two versions of notes for a lecture in a series of 60 lectures
are entitled ‘Physiological and psychological basis of logic’ (Ms. 745). These notes might well have
been written by a physiological  psychologist  last  week.  Although these are the clearest  such
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statements  in  that  they  specifically  use  the  phrase  ‘psychological  basis  of  logic,’  Peirce’s
statements concerning the nature of logic abound with statements linking logic to psychology:
‘logic is the theory of thinking’ (Ms. 634), ‘The real laws of logic are implanted in the human
mind, and an absolutely bad argument would violate the laws of mind’ (Ms. 413), ‘In its broader
sense, logic is the science of the necessary laws of thought […] also of the laws of the evolution of
thought’ (1.444), ‘I […] make the business of logic to be analysis and theory of reasoning,’ (4.134)
‘Logic may be defined as the science of the laws of the stable establishment of beliefs’ (3.429).”
14. While in the middle of the nineteenth century the philosophical approach was in Europe, the
most important, attempting, in the footsteps of the Cartesian tradition, to relate physiology to
psychology (cf. Alexander Bain’s The Senses and the Intellect or Spencer’s Principles of Psychology), in
America, one popular tradition (though with little direct input into academic psychology) was
phrenology. Peirce, while a teenager, had the “bumps” on his head read by a phrenologist (Ms.
1555). “One of phrenology’s close relatives, physiognomy – and especially that of Lavater – was
one of the sources of Peirce’s interest in psychology” (Ms. 1606. See Cadwallader 1975: 169-70).
15. See W1: 63, W1: 164-7, CN 1: 23-37, CP 1.310, CP 2.40-43, CP 2.47, CP 585, CP 5.157, CP 5.244-9,
CP 5.265, CP 7.376, CP 7.419-25, CP 8.144, MS 633 and MS 645. Cadwallader (1975: 170-1): “The
dominant psychology in America was a blend of theology and philosophy and in the hands, for
the most part, of the minister-college presidents. Such psychology as there was, typically, was
taught by the minister-presidents of colleges. Representative works of this period are those of
Laurens P. Hickok (1798-1888; president of Union College), Rational Psychology (1849) and Empirical
Psychology (1854), and of Francis Wayland (1796-1865; president of Brown), e.g., The Elements of
Intellectual Philosophy (1854).  Peirce appears to have been the first writer in America to begin
tolling the death knell of the “old” psychology as the psychology of Porter and McCosh was later
to be called. See Peirce’s Review of Porter’s The Human Intellect (The Nation, 1869, 8, 211-3), or his
Review of James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (edited by John Stuart Mill)
(The Nation,  1869, 9, 461-2).” Peirce castigated those of the Scottish and English “schools” for
failing  to  follow the  lead  of  Wundt  and other  German psychologists  in  their  attempts  at  “a
systematic course of observations and measurements” (461) and “to put psychology upon a basis
like that of the physical sciences” (462).
16. So I fully agree with Calcaterra stressing that “the methodological criterion of externalism is
one of the most recurring aspect of Peirce’s philosophy,” and that “its implications are different
in relation to the various contexts he applies to. In particular, externalism constitutes both an
alternative option to psychology as an analysis of the mind based on introspective criterion, and
an  approval  of  experimental  psychology  à  la  Wundt.  In  addition,  it  may  represent  a
methodological and theoretical  perspective calling for an approach to the normative level of
rationality that is quite different from Kant’s definition as it is envisaged in his own formula of
“anti-psychologism” (Calcaterra 2006: 36-7).
17. See Cadwallader (1975: 169-70): “From perhaps 1860 onwards, one can see an increasing focus
on psychological topics in Peirce’s writings.” 
18. Peirce  was  apparently  the  first  in  America  to  grasp  the  significance  of  the  “revolution”
operated by Wundt (1832-1920) and Fechner in Germany. He started reading Wundt as early as
1862 (Ms. 326: 1, 8.196 and 7.597).
19. “Peirce,  rather  than  James,  should  be  considered  ‘America’s  first  modern  psychologist’”
(Cadwallader  1975:  173-4).  In  particular  James,  “published  nothing  in  the  nature  of  a
psychological experiment until 1881.” Cadwaller claimes to have also “presented evidence that
Peirce’s 1877 psychophysical experiment was the first in that or related psychologic traditions
and suggested that, at least on the basis of a comparison with obvious alternative candidates and
an examination of the most like sources of earlier published experimental studies, that Peirce
was the earliest American experimental psychologist” (1974: 10, and 291-8).
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20. See “On the Theory of  Errors  of  Observations” (1873)  in  which Peirce  relates  behavioral
errors  to  neural  errors.  In  1875,  Peirce  obtained  two  grants  from  the  National  Academy  of
Sciences. One, for the study of color and the other, for for the comparison of sensations. See “Note
on the Sensation of Color” (The American Journal of Science, 1877, 113 (3rd series, 13), 247-51) and
his  only  published book,  Photometric  Researches (Leipzig,  Wilhelm Engelmann,  1878.  Vol.  9  of
Annals  of  the  Astronomical  Observatory  of  Harvard  College).  In  1884  Peirce  and  J.  Jastrow
published  their  important  paper  “On small  differences  of  sensations  (Memoirs  of  the  National
Academy of Sciences,  1884, 3, 73-83 (7.21-35)). “It is clear that Peirce founded the experimental
tradition in psychology at Hopkins, as Jastrow, who was Peirce’s student at Hopkins before Hall
arrived, explicitly stated” (Cadwallader 1975: 175-6). See Jastrow 1914, and 1916. Beside Jastrow,
Peirce had others as students and/or members of his Metaphysical Club, who became prominent as
psychologists: John Dewey, J. McKeen Cattell,  and Christine Ladd-Franklin. Not only did Ladd-
Franklin’s  interest  in  logic  stem  from  her  contact  with  Peirce,  but  Cadwallader  has  found
evidence that “her interest in visual processes in general and color processes in particular” had
also to be linked to Peirce’s (Cadwallader & Cadwallader 1974).
21. And of course, see the 1868 papers, the 1878-79 papers: “How to Make our Ideas Clear” and
“The Fixation of Belief.” In addition, see 8.196, 7.597, MS 891, MS 919-30, W3: 111-37 and W3:
382-493.
22. Here  I  partly  disagree  with  Hookway:  “Perhaps  the  most  distinctive  feature  of  his
philosophical  system […]  is,  from his  earliest  work,  a  total  repudiation of  naturalism,  and a
defence of epistemology (Grammar and Logic) as a prior philosophy” (Hookway 1984: 2).
23. See Tiercelin 1999, and 2003. 
24. See Tiercelin (1993a: 335-84).
25. While being “positive,” since their assertions (in logic, ethics or esthetics) rest on facts of
experience which force themselves upon us (5.120),  the normative sciences are not  practical
sciences – indeed, Peirce is eager to separate ethics from practical or “vital” concerns, (see, for
ex.,  Peirce’s first Cambridge Lecture (1898) in  Ketner & Putnam 1992) – because their object is
analysis  and  definition.  So  they  are  the  purely  theoretical  sciences  of  purpose,  of  purely
theoretical purpose (1.282).
26. Such views have been developed by Engel (1991: 306-20).
27. See 5.416. For a more detailed presentation of Peirce’s position on truth (and its proximity
with Ramsey), see Tiercelin 1993b, 2005a, and 2014.
28. On  the  complexities  introduced  by  the  growing  importance  of  phenomenology  or
phaneroscopy in Peirce’s new classifications of the sciences, and its implications for psychology,
see the nice remarks by Cadwallader (1975: 185-6) and Calcaterra (2006: 42-3).
29. 2.247, 3.434, 4.127, 2.278, 4.530-5322, NEM.IV: 318, 3.363, 2.279, NEM.IV: 38, 47-9 and 288, and
NEM.III, II: 749. 
30. See W1: 172-4. Short (2004: 216). 
31. On the importance, then, of Boole who, like him, “plainly thought in algebraic symbols” and
did not regard “thinking as consisting not necessarily in talking to oneself,” see Tiercelin (1993a:
42-6). See NEM 3/1: 161, 191, 227, 298 and 313-314, and W1: 404. Indeed, in Peirce’s use of signs,
there  is,  first,  the  habit  or  even reflex  of  a  mathematician,  which will  lead him to  think in
diagrams, with one regret only: not to be able, because of the “great cost of the apparatus” that
would be needed, to think ‘in stereoscopic moving pictures’ (ibid.).Thus, from the outset, Peirce’s
use of signs is linked with something more than practical convenience: it is the idea that one can
raise such a usage into a method; this is why he wrote that “by pragmatism is meant a philosophy
which should regard thinking as manipulating signs so as to consider questions” (NEM.III.I: 191).
32. For more details on the nature and aims of this project, see Tiercelin (1993a, in particular
27-57).
“Was Peirce a Genuine Anti-Psychologist in Logic?”
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-1 | 2017
20
33. So logic could be said (as early as the New List, dated 1867) to treat of second intentions as
applied  to  first”  (W2:  56).  On  the  advantages  of  such  a  view,  the  adoption  of  the  formal
(unpsychological) method of abstraction made possible by the various uses of Okham’s theory of
suppositio, and the way in which it provides a systematic analysis of the sign-relation within the
framework  of  a  radical  “semiotization”  of  the  mental,  but  also,  in  turn,  of  an  irreductible
“mentalization” of the sign, from which he may safely draw the unpsychologistic implications of
the view thate that “we have no power of thinking without signs” (W2: 213), see Tiercelin (2006:
165-8).
34. Such an attitude is, in my view, typical of the pragmaticist attitude towards knowledge and,
as a corrolary, towards scepticism, as I have shown in Tiercelin 2005a.
35. If we wish to analyse mental phenomena, the best way to do it is to look without more than
within (be it a self or a brain), namely into signs and semiotic activity (7.364, 7.583, 5.283, 5.314,
and 6.344). On Peirce’s emphasis on the superfluous character of a self or of a consciousness, see
5.462, 7.572, 8.225, 5.237, and 1.673.
36. Very  early,  Peirce  saw  not  only  what  practical  lessons  but  what  philosophical  and
methodological lessons could be learned from a comparison between not so much the thinking as
the reasoning process of the machine and that of man. “Precisely how much of the business of
thinking a machine could possibly be made to perform, and what part of it must be left for the
living  mind,  is  a  question  not  without  conceivable  practical  importance”  (NEM.III.I:  625,
NEM.III.I: 629-30, NEM.IV: 354, 2.56-59, 5.440, and 5.480). On all these points and on the possible
links between Peirce’s semiotic model of the mind and contemporary approaches in artificial
intelligence and cognitive science, see Tiercelin 1984, (1993a: 223-57), and 1995. More recently,
see Skagestad 2004. 
37. All matter is really mind, (6.301) “not completely dead, but merely mind hidebound with
habits” (6.158). See 6.255, 6.256, 6.262-264, 6.274, 1.402, and 6.36.
ABSTRACTS
The aim of  the paper is  to try and make one’s  ideas clearer about such concepts as “logic,”
“psychology,” “mind,” “normativity,” rationality,” as they were conceived by Peirce, in order to
elucidate  his  genuine  position  as  far  as  the  relationship  between  logic  and  pychology  is
concerned, whether he was or was not a straightforward “anti psychologist” in logic, and from
such analyses, to make some suggestions about the contemporary relevance of Peirce’s original
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